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Aquatic agricultural systems in developing countries face increasing competition from 
multiple stakeholders operating from local to national and regional scales over rights to access 
and use natural resources—land, water, wetlands, and fisheries—essential to rural livelihoods. 
A key implication is the need to strengthen governance to enable equitable decision-making 
amidst such competition, building capacities for resilience and transformations that reduce 
poverty. This paper provides a simple framework to analyze the governance context for aquatic 
agricultural system development focused on three dimensions: stakeholder representation, 
distribution of power, and mechanisms of accountability. Case studies from Cambodia, 
Bangladesh, Malawi/Mozambique, and Solomon Islands illustrate the application of these 
concepts to fisheries and aquaculture livelihoods in the broader context of intersectoral and 
cross-scale governance interactions. 
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1. introDuction
 
In assessing the factors that influence resilience, 
adaptability, and transformation in large social-
ecological systems, governance characteristics are 
not sufficient in themselves to explain divergent 
outcomes. Yet, they play an influential role, 
interacting with characteristics of the user groups 
and the resource system (Ostrom 2009). Good 
governance can be considered a foundation for 
diverse user groups and other stakeholders to 
build capacities to manage resilience (Lebel et al. 
2006). Learning how to make improvements in 
governance is especially important as the demands 
of managing resource competition across sectors 
and across geographic scales intensify (Dietz et al. 
2003, Adger et al. 2005, Wilson 2006). 
This paper presents and illustrates a framework to 
analyze the governance context for development of 
aquatic agricultural systems, intended as a tool to 
observe and compare differences across multiple 
cases and an aid to action research. We focus on 
developing country environments where aquatic 
resources play a critical role in rural livelihoods and 
poverty reduction. Occurring “along freshwater 
floodplains, coastal deltas, and inshore marine 
waters,” these aquatic agricultural systems (AAS) 
“are characterized by their dependence on seasonal 
changes in productivity, driven by seasonal 
variation in rainfall, river flow, and/or coastal and 
marine processes” (WorldFish 2011). By broadening 
the focus from individual production sectors 
(fisheries, crop agriculture, livestock, aquaculture) 
to integrated environmental, food production and 
livelihood systems, the AAS perspective aims to 
bring greater coherence to attempts to govern these 
systems for their contribution to food security and 
poverty reduction. The emphasis on resilience of 
livelihoods to multiple stresses and shocks demands 
a systems perspective in development planning and 
implementation. It recognizes that building social, 
political and economic rights is an integral element 
of poverty reduction, and a necessary foundation 
for efforts to build resilience and adaptive capacity 
(Allison et al. 2011). And it recognizes that in cases 
where current production systems are failing 
to meet the needs of local resource users, more 
fundamental transformations are needed (Walker 
et al. 2010).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next 
section, we summarize an approach to analyzing 
the governance context for AAS development. 
Drawing insights from resilience thinking and the 
broader literature on environmental governance, 
the framework focuses on three dimensions: 
stakeholder representation, distribution of power, 
and mechanisms of accountability. To demonstrate 
the utility of such a framework, we then present four 
case studies, addressing protected riverine wetlands 
in northern Cambodia, seasonal floodplain systems 
in Bangladesh, transboundary management of Lake 
Chilwa in Malawi and Mozambique, and artisanal 
marine fisheries in Solomon Islands. In each case, 
the particular challenges of small-scale fisheries 
and aquaculture development are presented in the 
context of broader intersectoral and cross-scale 
governance interactions. These cases highlight 
the formal and informal mechanisms that hold 
decision makers accountable towards poor and 
marginalized groups, including the role of bridging 
organizations that improve communication across 
sectors and geographic scales, and the role of civil 
society advocacy.  We then discuss the lessons 
and challenges of strengthening cross-scale 
governance in AAS in comparative perspective. In 
the concluding section, we reflect on the benefits 
and limitations of this analytical approach, and 
identify priorities for future research to understand 
and strengthen governance of AAS globally.
2. analyzing the 
governance 
context
 
Governance is often described in terms of positive 
attributes such as transparency or equity in 
decision-making, with relatively little attention 
to the underlying factors that constitute different 
governance arrangements or to the processes that 
help promote transitions in governance. Pursuing 
improvements in governance is not merely a 
technical process involving choice among design 
options, but a contested process of change, requiring 
deliberation over societal goals and underlying 
values (Armitage 2008). It is important, therefore, 
that the analytical framework used be critical rather 
than normative—in the sense that the description 
and assessment of how things are is distinct from 
the discussion of how things ought to be. It should 
also be suitable for use across a diversity of socio-
political settings, simple enough to be understood 
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by the resource users and other stakeholders 
themselves, and therefore appropriate for use in 
action research settings where the goal is practical 
insights that can be applied. The accumulated 
experience of integrating governance objectives 
into development assistance over the last two 
decades confirms that many of the most promising 
opportunities exist at local levels, requiring 
deliberation over locally-determined “best-fit” 
options as opposed to “best practices” imported 
from other countries (Carothers and de Gramont 
2011). Learning from such local innovations can 
also provide a foundation for policy reforms and 
institution-building at larger scales. 
The governance context of AAS describes the domain 
in which people’s authority to use, manage, or 
otherwise influence natural resources is exercised. 
It concerns the formal legal and institutional 
framework as well as the informal sets of norms, 
traditions, social networks, and power relationships 
that guide and constrain the interactions of 
stakeholders with one another and with the natural 
environment. The simple analytical framework we 
present here is adapted from a version developed for 
small-scale fisheries development. (see Ratner and 
Allison 2012 for a more complete discussion of the 
framework and its roots). Integrating concepts from 
the broader literature on environmental governance 
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999, Ribot 2002), it focuses 
on three distinct dimensions of governance—
stakeholder representation, distribution of 
authority, and mechanisms of accountability. 
These three dimensions provide the critical tools 
for assessing and describing the characteristics 
of different governance arrangements. They can 
be seen as the building blocks to determining 
what Lebel et al. (2006) term “positive attributes” 
of governance deemed essential to building 
the capacities of stakeholder groups to manage 
resilience and transformation (see Figure 1). In 
this perspective, the characteristics of stakeholder 
representation contribute to the goals of inclusive 
and deliberative decision-making; distribution of 
authority determines the degree to which there 
are polycentric and multi-layered institutional 
arrangements; while accountability mechanisms 
determine the strength of accountability in multiple 
directions and influence the just distribution of 
benefits. 
In Figure 2, we provide key questions to help 
orient analysis of each of these three dimensions 
of governance, as well as points of guidance or 
clarification and issues of particular concern that 
often merit attention in developing-country AAS. 
For each of these dimensions, both formal and informal 
mechanisms typically function in parallel (see 
Figure 3 for illustrations). In each case, the emphasis 
is on how decision-making works in practice, which 
may differ significantly from how it is meant to 
work in principle (Carothers and de Gramont 2011). 
In assessing mechanisms of representation, for 
example, formal mechanisms such as community 
representation in management committees, or 
local or regional bodies of government, need to be 
considered alongside informal mechanisms such as 
the communication of stakeholder interests through 
social networks or civil society organizations. To 
evaluate distribution of authority, it is critical to 
consider both formally-allocated authority as well as 
powers assumed in practice. In some countries, for 
example, traditional civic or religious institutions 
may be involved in determining resource access 
or resolving environmental conflicts even if it is 
not their primary focus, and they may operate in 
parallel to the more formal bodies of village and 
district government. 
Similarly, with regards to mechanisms of 
accountability, formal channels such as the 
court system need to be considered alongside 
informal mechanisms such as civil society 
advocacy and social movements. Compliance 
and enforcement of laws and local regulation 
may differ dramatically in practice, may be 
biased by the interests of government agencies, 
may be applied selectively to certain categories 
of resource users, or may be skewed according to 
class, ethnicity, gender, or religion. Historically, 
some informal enforcement mechanisms have 
functioned well at the community level, making 
enforcement by the state unnecessary (McCay and 
Acheson 1987, Ostrom 1990, Ruddle 1988). Most 
commonly, however, such informal mechanisms 
are incapable of handling the range of users 
competing for commercially valuable resources 
or the ecosystem threats that stem from other 
sectors of the economy (Berkes 2006, Dietz et al. 
2003, Foale and Macintyre 2000, Thorburn 2000). 
The framework summarized here is consistent 
with the more generic institutional analysis 
and development (IAD) model (Oakerson 1992, 
Ostrom 2005, 2009), focused on understanding the 
factors that influence opportunities for collective 
action in natural resources management and 
outcomes as measured by a variety of social and 
ecological criteria, including efficiency, equity, 
and resilience. It can be used as part of efforts 
to assess and promote cooperative, equitable 
resolution of resource competition, and capacity 
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Figure 1. Governance and capacities to manage resilience, adaptation, and transformation.  
Adapted from Lebel et al. (2006).
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Figure 2. Key questions and considerations in analyzing the governance context for development of aquatic 
agricultural systems.  Adapted from Ratner and Allison (2012).
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Which actors are 
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making and how?
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influence the livelihoods 
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Figure 3. Examples of formal and informal mechanisms for three dimensions characterizing the governance 
context for development of aquatic agricultural systems.  Adapted from Ratner and Allison (2012).
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to manage such competition (Ratner et al. 2010), as 
well as diagnosis of the institutional challenges 
affecting options for small-scale fisheries 
development (Andrew et al. 2007). As such, 
assessments using this analytical framework can 
contribute to broader, comparative analyses. 
The advantage of this framework, as compared for 
example to more elaborate models of interactive 
governance (e.g. Kooiman et al. 2008), is its practical 
intent and relative conceptual simplicity, making it 
more easily applied by local stakeholders as part of 
participatory action research and learning. Without 
prescribing answers, the framework aims to help 
structure assessments involving local stakeholders 
by posing questions about the present, the possible 
future, and the routes of influence to bridge that 
gap: How does the governance context affect local 
livelihood options now? What are the relevant 
institutions and relationships, including those 
we may not have considered before? What factors 
are unlikely to change, to which we’ll need to 
effectively adapt? Where are the opportunities for 
improvement? What groups might have influence 
in pursuing such progress? 
3. caSe StuDieS
 
In this section, we present four developing country 
case studies to illustrate how the framework can 
be applied to analyze the governance context 
for AAS development in diverse ecological and 
socio-political settings. Each case study draws 
on the direct experience of one or more of the 
authors, supplemented by published research and 
project documentation. Each case also represents 
an ongoing, long-term collaboration between 
the WorldFish Center and partners in a multi-
faceted program of action research and capacity 
building (WorldFish Center 2011). As such, the set 
of cases offers a useful basis for comparison and 
identification of common lessons and challenges 
that are helping inform future development efforts. 
Focused on fisheries and aquaculture as an entry 
point, these brief case descriptions highlight 
practical implications of efforts to analyze and 
improve stakeholder representation, distribution of 
authority, and mechanisms for accountability. 
Strengthening community 
voices for conservation in 
the wetlands of Stung treng, 
cambodia
 
The Stung Treng Ramsar site, a protected wetland 
along some 40 km of the Mekong River mainstream 
in northeastern Cambodia, is recognized 
internationally for its unique biodiversity value, 
featuring important habitat for migratory birds 
and deep pools that serve as spawning grounds 
for as many as 100 fish species. It is also a source 
of livelihood for 20 villages, which depend on 
the floodplain and riverbanks to cultivate rice 
and other crops such as watermelon, tobacco, 
cucumber, tomato, chili, potato, bean and eggplant. 
Subsistence fishing is the second major livelihood 
activity, and in the dry season attracts villagers 
from distant areas who establish makeshift tents on 
the sandbars. The river also provides a navigational 
route for transboundary trade between Stung Treng 
province and Champassac in neighboring Laos. 
Since 2005, a village-based action research 
initiative has worked to build local commitment 
to resource protection, as well as better advocacy 
of local interests, by engaging local government 
and the media. The initiative, known locally as 
Salaphoum, addresses a deficit in local stakeholder 
representation in decision making by supporting 
community members in four villages to document 
local knowledge of environmental resources—
such as fish species, their habitats and migration 
patterns, medicinal plants and their uses – 
improving their ability to take part in planning 
exercises (Salaphoum 2009). Community-produced 
media, using video footage taken by members 
within the research network, is developed as 
a tool for their advocacy work. Villagers have 
influenced the designation of fish habitats such 
as deep pools for protection, documented fishing 
gears and practices, and formed a network among 
neighboring villages to protect fisheries resources. 
An outcome evaluation shows that villages in the 
area now share information much more effectively, 
dialogue to trouble-shoot shared problems such as 
deterring illegal fishers, and engage in collective 
action such as joint patrols between neighboring 
community fisheries (Halpern et al. 2010).
Legal and administrative reforms have also 
increased the scope for community-based resource 
management in recent years, but overlapping 
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authority and limited government capacity pose 
serious constraints. The Fisheries Administration 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have 
supported development of 21 community fisheries 
in this section of the river, with authority to manage 
fisheries resources in public fishing grounds as 
authorized under a sub-decree on community 
fisheries (2007). Local fisheries and environment 
offices are both poorly staffed and financed however 
and, in addition, under the protected areas law 
(2008) management of the Ramsar site falls under the 
authority of the Ministry of Environment. Rangers 
and fisheries officers have difficulty monitoring the 
area because of high travel costs, while low wages 
and limited downward accountability encourage 
both to seek informal income, which is justified as 
supporting the cost of their operations. 
One of the most significant obstacles to improving 
enforcement is distribution of authority—in 
particular, the misfit between resource use rights 
and responsibility for protection. According to 
the fisheries law (2006), outsiders enjoy the same 
use rights as local community members, provided 
they follow local management rules. Yet, when 
outsiders violate these rules, there are few avenues 
of recourse for community fishery leaders, who 
do not have the authority to apprehend offenders 
(only to report them). Outsiders are not subject to 
the same social sanctions that act as deterrents 
for community members, and in many cases they 
employ large scale and sophisticated fishing gear, 
sometimes financed by powerful interests (Halpern 
et al. 2010).
Meanwhile, decentralization reforms outlined in 
the organic law on sub-national administration 
(2008) are introducing new opportunities to improve 
accountability. Local government units have 
typically been more responsive to local needs than 
fisheries and environment officers accountable to the 
central line ministries; however, they typically lack 
the resources to provide much support. By allocating 
fiscal resources to local planning committees 
at commune, district, and provincial levels, the 
decentralization reforms should in principle 
help address this gap. So far, however, natural 
resource management has received low priority in 
participatory commune planning processes, due 
to the immediate need for physical infrastructure, 
limited resource management capacity of local 
service providers, and lack of clear guidance on 
how to measure outcomes. Improving the ability 
of sectoral agencies to respond to local planning 
priorities is a key policy goal. Mechanisms to 
achieve this include strengthening capacity of local 
technical staff, developing young professionals to 
assume responsibilities of retirees, and delegating 
functions to appropriate sub-national levels (RGC 
2010). A final priority is improving the capacity of 
elected commune councils and their accountability 
to local constituencies (Mam 2009). 
Building accountability 
through community-based fish 
culture in seasonal floodplains, 
Bangladesh
 
Bangladesh has one of the largest inland fisheries 
in the world, with nearly 4.6 million ha of inland 
waters, 62% of which are floodplains (FRSS 2007). 
Intensive harvesting and land use change have 
reduced yields from natural floodplain fisheries. 
Augmenting natural productivity through fish 
culture is an important tool for strengthening the 
rural economy (Dey and Prein 2006). Although past 
fish culture interventions increased production, 
they have also resulted in fishers losing access rights 
(Barman et al. 2010, 2011), with negative effects 
on income of poor households and biodiversity 
(Toufique and Gregory 2008). In some cases, public 
floodplains leased to fisher groups are appropriated 
by influential people, with the benefits from fish 
culture accruing only to a few members. 
While there are various initiatives to introduce fish 
culture in privately owned floodplains through 
contracts between landowners and individual 
entrepreneurs, initiatives to bring public and 
privately-owned floodplains under community-
based systems with multiple beneficiaries are less 
common. In part this is because the approach is 
more demanding in its requirement for equitable 
institutions to balance the interests of fishers, 
landless and landowners (Collis et al. 2011). 
During 2005-2010, an initiative supported by the 
CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food 
experimented with such an approach, working 
both in publicly-owned floodplains surrounded 
by private lands, as well as privately-owned 
floodplains (Joffre and Sheriff 2011). 
The case of Beel Mail in Mohanpur at Rajshahi, 
a seasonal waterbody formed on public lands 
surrounded by private lands, illustrates the sharp 
divergence between distribution of authority in 
8 | Page
law and in practice. Local communities organized 
under the Melandi Fishers Society (MFS) gained 
legal access rights to the waterbody for a three-
year period by participating in an auction. But in 
practice they were often excluded, as the resource 
was captured by economically and politically 
influential local people. MFS members lacked 
representation in decisions regarding production 
management, conflict resolution, and benefit 
sharing. Elite capture of the Beel Mail floodplains 
stemmed from a serious lack of accountability in 
several respects: MFS was a weak institution, with 
little internal commitment among its members; 
its leaders were influenced by local elites who 
captured the floodplains with token payments; local 
government authorities, along with the department 
of fisheries, also had weak lines of accountability to 
local communities. 
Project support led to a significant improvement in 
representation within the MFS, plus improvements 
in downward accountability of local authorities and 
support agencies. As more MFS members became 
actively involved in floodplain management, its 
leaders gradually became more accountable to 
members in distributing roles, assuring distribution 
of benefits, as well as working to maintain active 
linkages with other local agencies to improve 
delivery of services. Elite capture was effectively 
stopped, with many withdrawing their claims on 
the resource, while those local elites who remained 
involved became active members of the MFS, 
providing support to fish culture management, 
ensuring security, and influencing formal 
institutions to support the community efforts when 
needed. Incursion by outsiders in illegal fishing 
has ceased, and local landless households have 
benefited by harvesting small, non-stocked species. 
Harvests of both stocked and non-stocked fish have 
more than doubled (from 282 to 691 kg/ha), with a 
similar rise in income (from US$192 to US$470/ha) 
(Joffre and Sheriff 2011). 
This experience is notable for its success in 
addressing the problems of weak downward 
accountability and elite capture. Researchers 
engaged in the project were able to build on many 
years of prior collaboration with the Department 
of Fisheries and local government institutions 
to diagnose the stakeholder relationships and 
institutional dynamics, and learn from the 
outcomes of prior efforts. Key insights included the 
importance of supporting marginalized households 
to assert their rights to resource use, as well as 
engaging relatively better-off fishers to invest in 
community-based efforts. These people then helped 
finance activities such as fish fencing, stocking, 
and management, which generated economic gains 
and encouraged others to participate (Barman et 
al. 2010, 2011). Where there was strong stakeholder 
representation, effective institutional linkages with 
local government, and accountability mechanisms 
to ensure equitable distribution of benefits, 
similar results were achieved on privately-owned 
floodplain lands as well. Where these governance 
features were lacking, outcomes were far less 
successful. At the Angarar Beel floodplain at 
Pirgonj in Ranpur, for example, participation of 
members was far less consistent, leaders lacked an 
orientation towards consensus building, had less 
extensive networks with local institutions, and 
were less able to negotiate with local authorities 
and fisheries officers. Complaints over lack of 
transparency on the use of investment funds and 
disputes over distribution of benefits stymied the 
initiative (Barman et al. 2011, Joffre and Sheriff 
2011). 
Parallel authorities and 
transboundary governance in 
the lake chilwa basin, malawi 
and Mozambique
 
Lake Chilwa lies in southeastern Malawi, spanning 
the border with Mozambique. A shallow, enclosed 
lake with a surrounding reed belt and a seasonally-
flooded plain, it is one of Africa’s most productive 
lake fisheries (Njaya et al. 2011). The basin provides 
fertile land for over 1.6 million people in Malawi 
growing mostly rice in the wetlands and maize in 
upland areas. The relatively high population density 
of 321 people per sq km (NSO 2008) is driving the 
expansion of cropland to marshes, forests and other 
marginal areas. The lake’s fish production is directly 
influenced by deforestation, upland agriculture 
and soil erosion within the catchment that deposits 
phosphorous and other pollutants, as well as urban 
waste runoff from Zomba City (Government of 
Malawi 2000). The lake is also highly sensitive to 
climatic variation. It dried out eight times in the 
last century, with resilient fish species surviving 
in the swamps and streams and re-establishing 
in the lake three to four years after (Njaya et al. 
2011). The fishery is predominantly artisanal, with 
fishers’ gear varying by season, water level and 
species targeted. The lake and its marshes form an 
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internationally significant ecosystem, designated a 
protected Ramsar site in 1997.
An important feature of local governance is parallel 
systems of authority aligned with local chiefdoms 
and national government. Traditional management 
strategies can be traced to the time when Lomwe, 
Yao and Nyanja ethnic groups settled around 
the lake, forming networks that cross today’s 
international border. The local chiefs appointed 
beach chairpersons, who developed a fishing 
calendar based on taboos and myths respected by 
each group. These traditional management systems, 
although modified, are still being practiced in small, 
cohesive communities as found in the islands of Lake 
Chilwa (Chisi and Njalo) as well as Lake Malawi 
(Mbenji). In parallel, the Malawian government 
instituted a centralized system, with Department 
of Fisheries as the sole fishery management 
authority. But in 1995, after the lake dried out and 
the fishery was depleted, government authorities 
initiated a co-management approach. While some 
of the regulations formulated under centralized 
management were retained, others were changed to 
reflect management and monitoring roles assigned 
to the newly-introduced Beach Village Committees. 
In some cases, these committees and traditional 
local leaders have come into conflict over authority 
to set and enforce rules (Kayambazinthu 1999, 
Njaya 2009).
Recently, the Lake Chilwa Climate Change 
Adaptation Program has introduced participatory 
monitoring, which serves to increase accountability 
of government and private sector actors. Fishers 
use logbooks to record catch, sales and incomes, 
providing more detailed information than 
previously available from government statistics. A 
preliminary assessment of these records revealed 
that fishing effort on Lake Chilwa had been 
underestimated by a factor of three to four, and 
suggested the number of people directly involved 
in fishing is also far greater than indicated by 
official data. With this information in hand, 
fishers have become more proactive in calling on 
government to improve enforcement and to adjust 
management approaches in response to the shifting 
resource status. By tracking financial records that 
demonstrate how much cash fishing can yield 
each month and year, fishers have also begun to 
promote a savings culture, which may open new 
options for local microenterprise development. To 
facilitate the savings and access to credit, fishers 
recently requested mobile banking services at the 
fish landing beaches. 
If such efforts succeed in strengthening fisheries 
co-management systems in Malawi, and if the 
competition with traditional authorities is resolved, 
significant challenges will still remain at the lake 
basin scale. One dimension involves the interface 
between land, water, agriculture and fisheries 
management. Agriculture authorities, for example, 
have promoted manual treadle pumps for irrigation 
to expand cropping on the lakeshore and riverbanks, 
inadvertently competing with efforts to protect 
critical aquatic habitats. So far, few institutions have 
developed to manage trade-offs and competition 
across sectors, such that poor users in particular 
are left to seek strategies to cope and adapt as 
livelihood opportunities shift. At the international 
scale, conflicts among fishers and between fisheries 
authorities in the two countries are frequent (Njaya 
2007). Fishing restrictions in Mozambique are less 
developed than in Malawi, so seine fishers, for 
example, migrate to the Mozambican side of the 
lake during their closed season when they are not 
allowed to fish in Malawian waters. Yet there is no 
joint committee or other institutional arrangement 
to handle such disputes, much less to undertake joint 
planning and management efforts – a significant 
gap in distribution of authority.
networking and advocacy 
among coastal communities in 
Solomon islands
 
The population of Solomon Islands resides 
predominantly in rural and coastal areas, and is 
highly dependent on subsistence and small-scale 
agriculture and fisheries for food security and 
livelihoods. Nationally, up to 80% of households 
participate in fishing activities, and in many 
rural areas alternative protein sources and 
income opportunities are limited (Bell et al. 2009). 
Although current population density is relatively 
low, Solomon Islands has one of the world’s fastest 
growing populations. The projected demand for 
fishery resources, alongside increasing pressures 
from global markets and climate change, threaten 
sustainability of marine biodiversity and the 
benefits it provides. The nation is situated within 
the coral triangle region of exceptionally high 
marine biodiversity, and therefore attracts global 
interest in the management and conservation of its 
marine resources (Coral Triangle Initiative 2009).
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Most land and near-shore marine areas are 
traditionally owned, and customary systems 
allow clans with tenure to control resource access 
and use. These customary tenure rights are 
constitutionally protected. National environmental 
and fisheries legislation also regulate near-shore 
marine resource use; however, lack of capacity and 
difficulties resolving state and traditional controls 
have limited the application of centralized measures 
for non-export fishing activities in rural areas. Over 
the last 15 years, communities and their partner 
agencies (predominantly international NGOs) 
have established over 130 locally managed marine 
areas (LMMAs) in Solomon Islands. The Solomon 
Islands locally managed marine area network 
(SILMMA) was established in 2003 by the Ministry 
of Fisheries and Marine Resources and NGOs as a 
national branch of the Asia-Pacific LMMA network. 
SILMMA’s objective is to promote information 
exchange, collaboration and coordination across 
the numerous government ministries, NGOs and 
communities involved in managing Solomon 
Islands’ marine resources (Cohen et al., in press).
The SILMMA approach is notable for clarifying local 
resource management authority by supporting state 
institutions to complement rather than compete 
with customary management regimes. NGOs 
typically facilitate the development of management 
arrangements and resource use rules, approved 
through consultation with reef-owning clans and 
the broader community. Rules are designed to 
combine local and traditional governance practices 
and ecological knowledge with contemporary 
scientific knowledge and management practice. 
Compliance is promoted by strengthening local and 
traditional leadership, enforcement, and dispute 
resolution systems. SILMMA NGO and government 
members are engaged in dialogue to develop legal 
reforms to support co-management, including 
measures to increase mutual accountability 
between provincial and community levels. Current 
draft legislation would, for example, decentralize 
authority to provincial government agencies and 
formally recognize community management 
plans in provincial ordinances, as well as provide 
new formal avenues for local representation and 
participation in the governance of near-shore 
fisheries and marine resources (Govan et al. 2011). 
Despite such efforts by SILMMA network members 
to facilitate representation of community interests 
in higher levels of governance, significant obstacles 
remain to enhance stakeholder representation and 
downward accountability. Community groups 
are often very reliant on financial, technical and 
logistical support received via their international or 
national NGO partners for management activities, 
and for engagement in the SILMMA network. 
Without appropriate mechanisms to ensure 
autonomy, community interests may be subordinated 
to partner, donor and government agendas, 
particularly where community representatives lack 
confidence to voice their concerns. Community 
representatives in the SILMMA network are selected 
at the local level, generally from a local resource 
management committee. This selection may be 
arbitrary (for example, where people in positions of 
power become representatives by default), and as 
a result, representatives may not be answerable to 
all sectors of the community. In particular, women’s 
representation on local committees, and their 
formal role in decision-making processes, is often 
lacking. 
While the SILMMA network has had some success 
in bridging fisheries and environment sectors, 
engagement with other sectors such as health, 
agriculture and education has been minimal 
to date. Therefore, improving sector-spanning 
representation in decision-making fora and 
horizontal accountability among sectoral institutions 
remain serious challenges. Bridging organizations 
like SILMMA have a role to play in dialogue to 
highlight, for example, how improvements in health 
and education services to remote communities 
can contribute to improvements in capacity for 
resource management, or how international trade 
policies affect domestic food security and potential 
for climate change adaptation. Playing such a 
role effectively, however, requires significant 
organizational capacity to bring together the 
sometimes competing agendas of different donors, 
initiatives, agencies and local communities. It also 
requires communication channels to introduce local 
perspectives in regional and global debates that 
will directly influence the livelihoods of coastal 
communities in Solomon Islands.
4. leSSonS anD 
challengeS
 
These four case studies represent a diverse set of 
AAS in riverine wetland, seasonal floodplain, 
lakeshore, and marine environments. They 
illustrate a range of governance challenges, from 
local to international scales, and a spectrum of 
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socio-political contexts. Yet, the cases also share 
some common characteristics that provide a basis 
for comparison. Each case demonstrates important 
linkages between local livelihoods dependent on 
aquatic resources and broader ecological, economic, 
and institutional trends. They illustrate increasing 
competition over environmental resources, 
and suggest the importance of improvements 
in stakeholder representation, distribution of 
authority, and mechanisms of accountability to 
address this competition equitably, in ways that 
support resilient livelihoods. In this section we 
discuss these three dimensions of governance in 
turn. 
Strengthening stakeholder 
representation
 
Strengthening representation of groups typically 
marginalized from decision-making is critical, 
considering the complexity of livelihood systems 
and the diversity of stakeholders involved in AAS. 
In the Bangladesh case, coalitions of community-
based organizations played a key role in helping to 
lobby government for community access to seasonal 
waterbodies, and the Bangladesh Environmental 
Lawyers Association provided legal and 
administrative support. More recently, some 250 
community-based organizations in the floodplain 
have established a federation, known as the Society 
for Water Resources Management, which continues 
to advocate for community tenure and management 
rights, along with improvements in the distribution 
of benefits derived from these waterbodies (Sultana 
and Thompson 2009, Thompson et al. 2010). The 
example of village-led research networks in 
Cambodia’s Stung Treng wetlands illustrates an 
earlier stage of supporting community capacity to 
articulate local interests. Downstream in Cambodia’s 
Tonle Sap Lake, where civil society groups are 
more densely represented, efforts to strengthen 
a national network of grassroots fisherfolk and 
increase their capacity to collaborate and negotiate 
with government authorities have recently helped 
to secure a formal transfer of access rights to 
fishing communities and to resolve access disputes 
spanning provincial boundaries (Ratner et al. 2011). 
Follow-on efforts are now addressing competing 
uses of water and seasonal crop agriculture in the 
flooded forest zone, and assessing management 
options that balance interests in conservation and 
economic development. 
Bridging organizations (Berkes 2002) that 
sustain representation of poor resource users 
in development decision-making and that help 
mediate interests across sectors and geographic 
scales are especially important. In the Solomon 
Islands example, a key challenge is increasing 
the influence of local resource users in national 
and regional policy formulation. The SILMMA 
network aids in this goal by providing a channel 
for information from communities, including 
community co-management experiences, to be 
considered in national and international policy 
arenas. The network also facilitates forums for 
dialogue with national government agencies and 
international NGOs, and provides logistical and 
financial support to enable community members 
to participate (Cohen et al. in press). In recent 
interviews of SILMMA members, two thirds of 
respondents felt that information provided by their 
organizations had already influenced national 
or regional policies concerning local marine area 
management. Mandates of SILMMA member 
organizations vary, however, between conservation 
of biodiversity or fisheries management for 
livelihood and food security, and longer or shorter 
planning horizons. While network heterogeneity is 
a valuable characteristic for responding to change 
and uncertainty (Folke et al. 2005), in practice these 
differences also present challenges to network-
wide information exchange, learning and collective 
action (Cohen et al., in press). It is a sign of progress 
that network members are grappling with these 
challenges, in contrast to a case like Lake Chilwa, 
where organizations to mediate transboundary 
management issues remain absent. In the case of 
Cambodia, there is an intergovernmental institution 
in place to mediate transboundary riverbasin 
management, the Mekong River Commission. Yet its 
very makeup means that local stakeholders such as 
riverside villagers in Stung Treng rely primarily on 
national government to represent their interests on 
matters such as construction of mainstream dams 
upriver in Laos. This illustrates the need for cross-
scale interactions that empower local user groups 
rather than extend control by central government 
or large-scale economic actors (Adger et al. 2005). 
redistributing authority 
 
Measures that redistribute rights to access, manage, 
and retain benefits from AAS are especially 
important in areas where marginalized groups 
have seen those rights eroded in the face of 
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increased competition. In Bangladesh, for example, 
community-based fish culture has enabled 
improvements in income and nutrition for the 
landless poor and women-headed households, two 
groups largely excluded from participation in the 
prior system that enabled capture of resource rights 
by local elites (Barman et al. 2010). In Stung Treng, 
Cambodia, village members of the Salaphoum 
research network face increasing pressure to 
balance longer-term conservation demands with 
improvements in access rights for local users to 
meet more immediate food production needs. 
Navigating these tensions is essential, as livelihood 
security and respect for basic human rights should 
be understood as a precondition for participation in 
longer-term resource management efforts (Allison 
et al. 2012). 
In some instances, clarifying tenure arrangements 
for resource management can undermine 
cooperation between groups or act as a catalyst 
for conflict within communities. This has been 
documented in Solomons Islands, for example, 
following establishment of management areas 
or conservation zones (McDougall 2005). The 
objectives of customary and state resource 
management institutions also may not be aligned, 
and these differences can present difficulties in 
forming hybrid institutions for coastal management 
(Foale et al. 2011). Traditional systems may also 
be inequitable and lack effective mechanisms 
of downward and horizontal accountability, as 
research in inland AAS in Sub-Saharan Africa has 
shown (Béné et al. 2009). 
In building capacity to resolve disputes over tenure 
and resource management authority, it is often 
useful to support parallel institutions. Comparative 
research on co-management institutions in Malawi, 
for example, suggests that where formal, local 
representative management institutions collaborate 
with the traditional chiefs, fisherfolk are able to 
access multiple avenues of recourse in clarifying 
resource claims and resolving disputes (Russell 
& Dobson 2011). In the Pacific, many initiatives 
to establish marine protected areas have ignored 
or sidelined local tenure and dispute resolution 
systems, while the most successful efforts have 
instead acknowledged the legitimacy of these local 
institutions, strengthening their capacity in areas 
such as monitoring and enforcement (Ferse et al. 
2010). 
Building accountability of 
decision-makers
 
Robust mechanisms of accountability are especially 
important at times when rights to access, use, and 
derive benefits from natural resources are being 
re-allocated or negotiated. In the case of floodplain 
waterbodies in Bangladesh, as community-based 
organizations became more active in advocating 
for community rights, and more effective in 
communicating with local government, they were 
able to avert elite capture in many locales. Similarly, 
in Cambodia a recent wave of mobilization in 
response to tensions between large-scale and 
small-scale users of fisheries and agricultural land 
in the Tonle Sap floodplain culminated in a three-
year suspension of commercial fishing concessions. 
As national authorities launch a period of review 
and analysis of future management options, 
continued engagement by civil society groups, 
close monitoring by the media, and independent 
research are important mechanisms to promote 
public understanding and deliberation over the 
likely consequences of various policy options 
(Ratner 2011). 
Even where traditional management systems may 
be absent, informal mechanisms of accountability 
are typically critical alongside more formal 
mechanisms. In each of the four cases summarized 
in this paper, the courts are inadequate to handle 
the number and range of disputes at play among 
competing users of land, fisheries, water, and 
wetlands. Even assuming expanded capacity, 
however, courts represent a costly and inappropriate 
mechanism to settle many disputes, which often 
hinge more on establishing effective dialogue and 
negotiation than on interpreting existing law. In 
the Lake Chilwa case, for example, support for 
participatory monitoring and analysis of fisheries 
production trends at the lake scale is influencing 
local stakeholders’ understanding of policy and 
management options, bringing new voices into 
the policy debate, and increasing public scrutiny 
of management decisions. In the Cambodia case, 
decentralization reforms have provided an opening 
for local communities to take part in resource 
management planning alongside provincial and 
local authorities. Yet, injecting concerns over food 
security and livelihoods in broader development 
policy decision-making such as plans for hydropower 
dams remains exceptionally difficult, despite 
increasing evidence of the risks (Ziv et al. 2012). Such 
challenges accentuate the need for independent 
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research and media, and civil society engagement 
to draw attention to the linkages between sectors 
such as energy, fisheries, and agriculture, between 
human rights and the environment, and between 
gender equity and economic development. This 
is essential to hold decision makers accountable 
for the exercise of their authority, moving beyond 
the “rhetoric of participation” (Evans et al. 2011) 
and expanding demand for good governance more 
generally (Carothers and de Gramont 2011). 
5. concluSion
 
In many aquatic agricultural systems, local resource 
users are witnessing increased competition 
from multiple stakeholders at local to national 
and regional scales over rights to access and use 
natural resources—land, water, wetlands, and 
fisheries—essential to rural livelihoods. A key 
implication is the need to strengthen governance 
to enable equitable decision-making amidst such 
competition. The simple analytical framework 
developed in this paper aims to facilitate action 
research to diagnose obstacles and opportunities 
for improving governance in developing-country 
AAS. It can also aid comparison of the governance 
context for development of AAS, within and across 
countries. 
The cases presented here illustrate the sorts of 
questions that researchers and local actors can 
explore using the concepts of representation, 
authority, and accountability, and the practical 
insights this yields. In these cases, we have used 
fisheries and aquaculture as an entry point, but 
livestock production, agricultural cropping systems, 
water management, biodiversity conservation, or 
more integrated approaches in coastal or inland 
systems are equally suitable entry points. Whatever 
focus one chooses at the outset, governance 
analysis encourages analysts to explore linkages in 
the form of stakeholder interests, power relations, 
and institutional relationships that span sectors 
and scales. In this respect, governance analysis 
can complement analysis of ecosystem linkages, 
and indeed the two should go hand in hand. By 
identifying critical obstacles and opportunities 
that build on an understanding of the full social-
ecological system, researchers and development 
practitioners can better support efforts to strengthen 
livelihood resilience.
This overview also highlights important gaps and 
priorities for the future. Integrated approaches to 
agricultural productions systems are rare, and 
have been largely absent from aquatic systems. 
In consequence, researchers lack systematic 
analyses of governance across multiple cases with 
a multidimensional view of food and livelihood 
systems. We need improved tools and better evidence 
to assess the role of gender equity in governance of 
AAS, as gender relations often strongly influence all 
three dimensions of governance yet are frequently 
under-appreciated. This should reveal, for example, 
how improvements in women’s representation and 
decision-making authority affect the leadership 
capacity and accountability of community-based 
organizations, government agencies, and NGOs. 
We need more refined tools to assess private sector 
roles in governance, addressing challenges such 
as how to manage risks and opportunities from 
commercial investment in AAS, and how to secure 
more benefits for poor households. 
There is also an overarching need for better 
monitoring and evaluation of governance change 
in aquatic agricultural systems to trace the 
contributions towards livelihood improvements 
such as household income and child nutrition. These 
efforts should measure reductions in vulnerability 
through improvements, for example, in women’s 
rights or the participation of indigenous minorities 
in policy decision-making. As a part of participatory 
action research initiatives, local actors can monitor 
and assess change in such outcomes in parallel 
with community-based monitoring of ecosystem 
status, and identify priorities for future action to 
influence institutional and governance reforms. 
The framework can also be applied in assessments 
that aim to identify opportunities for investment in 
governance strengthening. When such assessments 
involve local stakeholders in ways that influence 
future programming priorities of official aid 
agencies, NGOs, and other development partners, 
this can help improve downward accountability of 
aid agencies to the communities they aim to serve 
(Blagescu et al. 2005). 
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When used for cross-country comparative analyses, 
assessments of institutional change in aquatic 
agricultural systems can improve understanding of 
the links between governance attributes, capacities 
for managing resilience and transformation, and 
ultimate outcomes in terms of equity, resources 
sustainability, and reduction in multiple dimensions 
of poverty. Such comparative analysis is critical 
in order to test and refine hypotheses about the 
causal pathways posited by Lebel et al. (2006), 
probing, for example, how different arrangements 
of distribution of authority and accountability 
influence the capacity to manage cross-scale 
dynamics. Most urgently, it can provide lessons 
about how development initiatives addressing 
natural resource management and livelihoods can 
empower local actors to work towards governance 
improvements in challenging developing-country 
environments. 
Finally, greater awareness of the limitations of 
short-term top down solutions to the dynamic 
and unpredictable challenges faced by farmers 
and other rural resource users is highlighting the 
central importance of building the capacity of these 
communities to adapt in the face of future change. 
Improved governance, and improved capacity 
of communities to shape their governance, are 
key elements of this more effective development 
environment. Development investments to support 
improved resource governance, and research to 
inform this, will be critically important elements of 
efforts to reduce poverty and improve food security 
in aquatic agricultural systems. 
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